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The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie is not the same a s  in other countries. I t  has very peculiar 
characteristics. 
. Daniel Ortega 
This was a strike by millionaires who have forgotten that  m y  government assured them the social 
peace necessary to build up their fortunes. 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
The agrarian bourgeoisie of revolutionary Nicaragua is a n  anomalous class. Alone among 
land holding classes in contemporary Central America i t  failed to vigorously resist revolutionary 
pressure. Instead a substantial fraction of this class allied itself with a revolution against the 
system which had created its wealth. And nine years after that  revolution members of this class 
fraction remain in control of their estates dominating, as they had before 1979, production in the 
critical coffee and cotton export sectors and retaining a substantial position in cattle, rice, and 
sugar. In  revolutionary Peru and Bolivia land holding classes were targets not allies of the 
revolution and lost their lands almost immediately. In Cuba all private holdings of any size were 
gone in four years (Eckstein 1982). Among Latin American revolutions only in Mexico did 
agrarian capitalists join a revolution but unlike Nicaragua i t  was a revolution they came to 
dominate. Only in Nicaragua did an agrarian bourgeoisie join a socialist revolution and only in 
Nicaragua does a n  agrarian bourgeoisie coexist with a government committed to some version of 
revolutionary socialism. Both before and after the revolution the Nicaraguan agrarian bourgeoisie 
does in fact have some peculiar characteristics. 
The presence of a fraction of the pre-revolutionary agrarian capitalist class as well as the 
remarkable political openness of revolutionary Nicaragua provide an unusual opportunity to 
examine class organization and consciousness in this anomalous class while the experience of the 
revolution is a matter of the recent past. Oral history is always subject to the frailty of human 
memory and attention, but in this case the moment of historical transformation is still close a t  
hand. For the agrarian bourgeoisie in contemporary Nicaragua revolutionary class struggle is still 
a matter of personal experience in everyday life. Survey studies of the economic and technical 
behavior of coffee and cotton growers, including, although not limited to, large growers, have been 
undertaken (Baumeister and Havens no date; Colburn 1986; Gariazzo, Incer, Soley, and Dye 
1983; Sequeira 1981), but relatively less research has been conducted on class formation and 
consciousness, although excellent overviews can be found in the works of Sholk (1984) and Gilbert 
(1985; 1987). The present study is an  attempt to extend this earlier work by focusing on the 
relationship between technical economic issues and political and class consciousness among the 
fraction of the agrarian bourgeoisie which still remained in Nicaragua in the summer of 1986. 
The study is based on in-depth interviews with 23 of the largest coffee and cotton producers a s  
well a s  conversations with officers, former officers, and staff of the principal regional and national 
producers' associations; and technical staff and officials of the Ministry of Agricultural 
Development and Agrarian Reform and its research division, the National Development Bank, and 
the national cotton and coffee boards. 
The core of the data, however, is the interviews with the growers themselves who were 
remarkably open about both their personal economic and social situation and their political views. 
The growers interviewed include some of the wealthiest and most influential private producers in 
post-revolutionary Nicaragua, as well a s  most of the principal leaders and official spokespersons of 
this class. Most of them are well known figures in their communities and regions, many bear 
some of the most distinguished names in pre-revolutionary Nicaraguan society, and a number are 
nationally and internationally known figures. Almost all, however, requested anonymity and their 
request will be respected here. Together the 18 coffee growers contribute almost 10 percent of the 
-1 coffee exported by Nicaragua. The five cotton growers include two of the five largest private 
producers. Care was  taken to insure that  those interviewed spanned the entire range of attitudes 
toward the revolution and members of both pro- and anti-government producers' organizations 
were included.' The interviews focused on their economic and political situation during the final 
years of the Somoza dynasty and the period since the revolution, although the growers were 
considerably more forthcoming on the latter subject than the former. The interview transcripts 
present a portrait of the thoughts of this anomalous class in the process of forming itself. This 
class and its ideology reflect both the historical experience of the revolution itself and peculiarities 
of pre-revolutionary Nicaraguan economic and political structure. Each of these matters requires 
more detailed consideration. 
The Agrarian Bourgeoisie in Pre-Revolutionary Nicaragua 
Although there are disagreements over the not insignificant issues of the relative 
contribution of the agrarian bourgeoisie to the revolution and the primary axis of class cleavage in 
the Somozas' Nicaragua, there is considerable agreement among both academic observers 
(Baumeister 1982; Black 1981; Gilbert 1985, 1987; Gilly 1980; Torres Rivas 1975; Vilas 1986; 
Weber 1981) and Sandinista intellectuals (Lopez, Nuiiez, Chamorro and Serres 1980; Nuiiez no 
date; Morales 1980; Wheelock 1978) on the general characteristics of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. 
Many of these characteristics and some additional ones are also evident in the interviews with the 
coffee and cotton growers. 
As was the case elsewhere in Central America, the Nicaraguan agrarian bourgeoisie had 
i ts  origins in the great nineteenth century expansion of capitalism which pulled the region into the 
world economy as  a dependent supplier of primary commodities and ignited explosive growth in 
coffee production and area in the latter half of the century. The new elite of coffee growers, 
processers, and exporters either seized or attempted to seize power throughout the region in order 
to adapt the state to the Liberal agenda of scientific positivism, agricultural export promotion, 
infrastructure development, unencumbered capital accumulation and oligarchic rule. By 1900 the 
coffee oligarchs held power everywhere except in backward Honduras which missed the nineteenth 
century coffee boom and later became a banana, rather than a coffee, republic. In Nicaragua this 
great transformation began under Conservative Party auspices in the period 1857-1888 but 
reached its climax in the liberal revolution and dictatorial rule of Jose Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) 
which saw both the production and power of the coffee elite expand enormously. True to the coffee 
elite's Liberal agenda Zelaya embarked on an amibitious development program which proved, in 
the end, to be his and the agrarian bourgeoisie's undoing. Disturbed by Zelaya's overture to 
British, German, and Japanese capital and, in particular, his efforts to promote the construction of 
a second canal along the Nicaraguan route, the United States intervened in 1909 and installed 
Adolfo Diaz, a compliant, Conservative attorney for the American-owned Rosario Light Mines 
Company, as president of the country. When the United States again intervened in 1912 to 
prevent the Civil War between Liberals and Conservatives that  its earlier intervention had done so 
much to stimulate, it came to stay not leaving again, except for a brief interlude from August 
1925 to January 1926, until January 1933. The cooperative Mr. Diaz turned over control of the 
customs house and thus the critical coffee export economy to the New York banking firm of Brown 
Brothers Seligman which also gained control of the Nicaraguan National Bank. Together Brown 
,.. , 
Brothers and the National Bank established the C o m ~ a n i a  Mercantil & Ultramar  (Overseas 
Trading Company) which monopolized coffee exports until the 1950s. The original cause of United 
States intervention was not overlooked. In 1916 the United States imposed the one-sided Bryan 
Chamorro treaty which ceded to the United States canal rights in perpetuity in exchange for a 
payment of three million dollars to the Conservative party. This transaction gave rise to the 
enduring epithet vende j a t r i a  (literally, country seller) which has  become a staple of anti-imperial 
rhetoric ever since. 
The most enduring legacy of the long American intervention was, of course, the rise of 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia from ownership of a small Carazo coffee estate to absolute power 
through dint of his proficiency in English, his closeness to the American Ambassador and his wife, 
and his willingness to submit the Liberal Party to American control. The intervention also created 
an enduring and ultimately triumphant myth in the figure of Augusto Ce'sar Sandino who, alone 
among Liberal generals, rejected the accord signed a t  Espino Negro in 1927 by leaders of the 
Conservative and Liberal parties under the tutelage of United States Secretary of State Henry 
Stimson. The accord established a U.S. sponsored military dictatorship and "Espino Negro" soon . 
took its place as  a symbol of political compliance and national betrayal. Sandino and his "crazy 
little army" fought on against the United States Marines until they were withdrawn in 1933. But 
on February 21, 1934, after leaving a dinner meeting with Somoza, then head of the Nicaraguan 
National Guard, Sandino was murdered on the future dictator's direct orders. The Somoza 
dynasty, based on control of the United States trained and organized National Guard, had begun. 
I t  would endure for almost fifty years. 
The United States intervention and the rise of Somoza and his National Guard ended any 
possibility for autonomous economic development led by the coffee bourgeoisie. As Deere and 
Marchetti (1981, p. 44) note: 
The overall impact of the foreign intervention was to strengthen the hand of the 
traditional oligarchy vis-h-vis the reform minded coffee entrepreneurs. As a result 
bourgeois reforms were much shallower in Nicaragua than they were in El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala; and to this date, coffee production in 
Nicaragua lags far behind the neighboring countries in terms of yields and the 
modernization of the productive sector. 
Control over exports by the Overseas Trading Company deprived the coffee elite of the 
most lucrative part  of the coffee business and severely retarded their ability to accumulate capital. 
Control of the banking system by non-coffee interests restricted credit for technical improvements 
and expansion. Infrastructure development slowed to the extent that  by 1950 there were only 170 
miles of paved roads in the country (Laird 1974, p. 30). Warfare in the North Central coffee 
region severely disrupted production and caused a number of growers to give up in despair. 
Expansion in the North Central coffee sector did not begin again until the 1960s. The consequence 
of United States intervention for the coffee elite was defeat and displacement; for the coffee 
economy, senescence and decay. As one discouraged Nicaraguan observer wrote in 1961 (Delgado, 
p. 39): 
To the extent that  one is referring to coffee cultivation, we have stayed with the 
techniques of 1849 [the approximate date of the first Nicaraguan plantings] 
indifferent to everything that  has taken place beyond our borders. 
In neighboring El Salvador, by contrast, port, railway, and road building and Liberal 
control of the state created the conditions for rapid capital accumulation in coffee. The Salvadoran 
oligarchy came to control not only production but also modern factory processing plants and the 
lucrative export trade. From this base they rapidly gained control over numerous coffee estates, 
the banking system, and, ultimately, much of the economy (Aubey 1968-69; Baloyra 1982, pp. 22- 
32). The result was the best organized, most militant and financially powerful ruling elite in 
Central America. In Nicaragua, by contrast, the integrated empires of production on numerous 
estates, ownership of processing plants, and control of export trade and finance were largely 
absent. Instead, as Wheelock (1978, p. 146) notes: 
... the coffee producer in Nicaragua is fundamentally dependent on the National 
bank, casually attends to his plantings once in a while. These observations place in 
relief the frustrated character of the coffee bourgeoisie, its backwardness, decay, 
and its ever more crushing weakness. 
As Wheelock w.) also points out, the backwardness of the Nicaraguan coffee bourgeoisie also 
accounts for its underrepresentation in the major non-Somoza economic groups that  came to 
dominate economic life in Nicaragua before the revolution. 
In  Nicaragua most coffee growers owned their own estates and little else. The vertically 
and horizontally integrated coffee enterprises and coffee-based financial dynasties of El Salvador 
were almost entirely absent in Nicaragua. In Matagalpa two British immigrants managed to 
convert control of a coffee processing plant into such a financial empire -- the Calley Dagnall firm, 
which came to control some fifty coffee estates, a regional bank, half of the coffee trade of the 
North Central region and 10 percent of total Nicaraguan coffee exports (Wheelock 1978, pp. 142- 
143; Gariazm &A. 1983, p. 10; Sequiera 1981, p. 112). Duilio Baltodano, a large Carazo 
planter, moved into exports in the 1950s after the end of the Overseas Trading Company 
monopoly, became a founding shareholder in the Nicaraguan Bank of America, owner of 
CISAGRO, a major agricultural inputs importing firm, and proprietor of the largest soluble coffee 
plant in Central America (Int., 1985). Arturo Vaughan, whose grandfather and namesake had 
been the most efficient producer in Nicaragua in 1910, used the family coffee estate, k n  
Francisw, as  the base for a multinational enterprise which included a mechanized egg production 
operation accounting for almost a fifth of Nicaraguan egg production before the revolution (Int., 
1986). But these men were the exception. More typical were the isolated semi-feudal estates 
described by Wheelock (1978) in his classic study Im~erialismo v diet-. 
There was one other empire in coffee. Anastasio Somoza Garcia took advantage of the 
'confiscation of German estates in World War I1 to make himself the largest coffee planter in the 
country with some 46  estates by 1944 (Wheelock 1978, p. 166). Alemania, the largest coffee 
estate in Pacific Nicaragua, was confiscated from Alfredo Balke, a German grower, renamed after 
Somoza's mother and titled under his sister's name (Int., 1986). La -, the largest estate 
in Matagalpa, was providentially acquired by Somoza from the heirs of its English owner who had 
returned to his homeland to escape the dangers of guerilla war  during the Sandino period 
(Christian 1986, pp. 25-26). As Somoza himself observed, "My father taught me that  i t  is better 
to buy from the heirs" (quoted in Wheelock 1978, p. 166). Or as one of the growers interviewed 
observed, "Somoza was good at getting people to sell." But with the notable exceptions of Somoza 
and Calley Dagnali few growers owned more than one or, a t  most, two estates and few followed 
the examples of Baltodano and Vaughan into diversified economic activities. 
The absence of vertical and horizontal integration, lack of economic diversification, and 
general technical and financial weakness of the Nicaraguan coffee growers made effective industry 
organization and political action difficult. In  El Salvador the Coffee Growers' Association and the 
Salvadoran Coffee Company, controlled by the Association and a grower-controlled bank, 
effectively managed the coffee economy from World War I1 until 1979 (Habib 1958, pp. 138, 143; 
Lopez 1986, pp. 6-9). In Costa Rica the Institute for the Defense of Coffee and later the Ofice of 
Coffee, dominated by large producers, played a major role in controlling prices ar.d exports and in 
modernizing the industry (Seligson 1975, p. 28; Hall 1982, p. 152). In Colombia the Association 
of Coffee Growers, internationally known through its advertising symbol, Juan Valdez, constitutes 
a virtual state within a state (Palacios 1983, pp. 509-537). Although a coffee growers' association 
existed in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua it confined itself to publishing a magazine of technical 
information a1 Caf6 de Nicaragua) and choosing "Miss Nicaraguan Coffee" of the year. The 
powerful Association of Coffee Growers of Matagalpa, which played a key role in the political 
conflicts of the immediate post-revolutionary period (Christian 1986, pp. 197-215; Gilbert 1987, 
Chapter 5, pp. 19-20) was  not founded until August 2, 1979, almost a century after large scale 
coffee production began. The Nicaraguan agrarian bourgeoisie lacked not class interests, which it 
had had from the time of Zelaya, but economically based class coherence and effective industry 
oranization. After Somoza Garcia's intervention in the German estates, however, the dynasty left 
coffee growers to their own devices confining itself a s  Colburn (1986, p. 68) notes, "...to collecting 
taxes, negotiating with the International Coffee Organization (OIC) over export quotas, and 
controlling diseases." 
Nevertheless coffee remained the principal source of foreign exchange and domestic wealth 
throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries. In the 1950s and 
\ 
1960s, however, a second dramatic expansion of world capitalism once again transformed the 
Nicaraguan economy. Stimulated by the Korean War boom in commodity prices and the long post- 
war  expansion the new export economy was based on cattle, sugar, and, above all, cotton. Thanks 
to the high Korean War prices and effective pesticides developed during World War 11, cotton 
production expanded exponentially in the 1950s and 1960s going from 5,000 bales in 1949 to over 
500,000 bales in 1965 (Williams 1986, p. 197). It became the driving motor of the entire 
Nicaraguan economy, stimulating development in a way that  coffee had never done. As Pedro 
Belli (1968, p. 48) describes the period: 
The cotton boom ... brought wealth to the Nicaraguan farmers, [a] more dynamic 
mentality to other sectors of the economy, unprecedented rates of growth, new 
industries and a more diversified export basket. In 15 years the "white gold" 
ended the secular stagnation that  foreign intervention, internal revolts and reliance 
on coffee and gold had fostered. 
The cotton boom created a new class of millionaire cotton growers in Leon and Chinandega many 
of whom were traditional land owning families who managed to transform aristocratic holdings 
into agrarian capital (Nufiez no date, p. 127). The social consequences of the cotton boom were 
profound and contributed significantly to the political conflict which ultimately undermined the 
Somoza regime (Paige 1985; Williams 1986). But in the short run they stimulated great new 
wealth and made possible the beginnings of an industrial, urban economy. As one grower 
describes the period: 
... the economy was not coffee. I t  was hundreds of small and medium businesses 
that  were expanding tremendously before the revolution. The country was on a 
roll. The real boom was in cottdn. It was helping everyone. Our workers were 
able to buy televisions and refrigerators ... 
Although the boom did not in fact help everyone and led to poverty and landlessness for 
many (Nuiiez no date; Williams 1986) i t  did indeed stimulate a genuine, if uneven, economic 
development. The boom interacted with and reinforced a n  economic opening created by a political 
deal between Somoza's Liberals and his Conservative opponents which ended the National Bank's 
monopoly of the financial system and provided new commercial opportunities for non-Somoza 
interests. I n  1953 newly rich cotton men from Leon and Chinandega and Managua merchants 
established the Bank of Nicaragua (BANIC) which followed by a year the establishment of the 
Bank of America (BANAMERICA) by Conservative cattle and sugar men taking advantage of 
their deal with Somoza (Black 1981, p. 38; Wheelock 1978, pp. 146-147). Although these banks 
were affiliated with American banks they represented the consolidation of Nicaraguan capital and 
the "business groups" that  these banks came to organize dominated substantial sectors of the 
Nicaraguan economy especially real estate development, construction, manufacturing, and 
agroexports (Strachen 1972; Wheelock 1978). The integrated financial empires which failed to 
emerge in the epoch of coffee now for the first time made their appearance in Nicaragua with the 
cotton boom. 
Cotton differed from coffee in other respects. Nicaraguan coffee cultivation was the most 
technically backward in the region; Nicaraguan cotton growing was the most technically advanced 
in the Western Hemisphere (Parsons 1965; Brooks 1967; Williams 1986). Cotton farming 
depended on agro-chemicals, motorized agricultural machinery, high powered crop dusting aircraft 
and, to a surprising extent given the low price of labor in Nicaragua, on automated harvesting 
equipment. Indeed land was a relatively minor factor in cotton production and much of it was 
rented. As Laird (1968, pp. 40, 55) notes, cotton produc.tion in general and technologically 
sophisticated production in particular benefit a local economy through their significant backward 
and, especially, forward linkages. Cotton production stimulated the local mixing of agro-chemicals, 
albeit under the control of foreign corporations, the industrial ginning of seed cotton, the 
manufacture of cotton seed oil and, to a lesser extent, cotton cloth. Opportunities for local 
entrepreneurs were also available in crop dusting, import, sale, and maintenance of machinery, 
and financial services. These structural characteristics in a highly profitable industry led to the 
rapid consolidation of integrated financial empires in cotton. The Argiiello family, the leading 
- growers in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, controlled. more than 11,000 m a n z a n a  ( I  manzana 
.69 ha.) of cotton land in more than 15 different estates, was  a member of an important secondary 
banking group, and lived in an opulent style that  involved weekends in Acapulco in their own 
bimotor aircraft (Nufiez no date, pp. 129-142; Wheelock 1978, p. 201; Int. 1986). Other cotton 
growing families, such as the Gurdian and Mantica, became major merchants of agricultural 
inputs and owners of processing plants. The largest cotton gin in Central America was built 
outside Leon by a partnership of local growers (Int., 1986). Integrated financial empires were 
almost entirely absent in Nicaraguan coffee. They dominated Nicaraguan cotton production. 
There were, however, distinct limits on the financial power of the cotton growers. Exports 
were controlled by 16 firms, most of which were local representatives of such multinational giants 
as Mitsui of Japan or the Allenberg Cotton Company of Memphis (Nufiez no date, p. 47). Agro- 
chemicals were supplied by a small number of foreign chemical firms including Monsanto, Olin, 
Tenneco, and Hercules Powder, all United States based Fortune 500 companies (Williams 1986, p. 
201). John Deere and International Harvester were the major suppliers of agricultural machinery. 
Credit, particularly in the early years, was controlled by Somoza's National Bank although this 
control was later diluted by the end of the bank's lending monopoly. However wealthy and 
powerful the cotton growers might become they remained closely tied to both international capital 
and the Somozas' empire. Like the coffee growers they never succeeded in organizing effective 
producers' organizations. The Leon Cotton Growers' Association, the Chinandega Cotton Growers' 
Association, and the Western Cotton Growers' Association were not founded until August 1978 as 
Vilas (1986, p. 139) notes, "...almost thirty vears after the initiation of cotton raising." 
The coffee growers lacked the financial resources and organizational coherence to mount a 
sustained challenge to Somoza power. The cotton growers had begun to attain the kind of 
integrated financial weight, if not the formal organizations, which make political power possible. 
But they still faced the political consequences of the American intervention in the form of the 
Somocista state. This curious, but remarkably resilient, political structure was based, 
fundmentally, on the American-trained Nicaraguan National Guard which the first Somoza 
transformed into a dynastic Praetorian Guard (Millet 1977). The Nicaraguan state was not a s  
Morales (quoted in Hodges 1986, p. 206) notes, "the armed power of the bourgeoisie," but rather 
"the armed bourgeoisie in power." Somoza used his control of the Guard to build a huge financial 
empire, first in coffee and cattle, then in sugar, rice, dairy, agricultural processing industries, and 
finally in highly diversified manufacturing, service, construction, and real estate activities ranging 
from the national airline to Managua's best known discotheque (Lopez a ~ l .  1980, pp. 347-356; 
Wheelock 1978, pp. 163-176; Black 1981, pp. 34-36). The resulting system has  been called 
"Sultanic" by Torres Rivas (1975, p. 115) after Max Weber's (1947, p. 62) categorization in 
which: 
... the chief tends to treat his position of authority a s  a personal prerogative, almost 
.as his private property, and the subjects hence as  instruments in carying out 
whatever projects he may have in hand. 
Or  as a large cotton grower observed: 
He ran the country as  if it were his private farm. I can remember a meeting in 
which a government agency, the development bank, was having some problems and 
Somoza said, "What's the problem. I'll loan i t  5 million dollars." It was like his 
personal possession. He treated the assets of the state as his personal possession. 
Somoza's "Sultanic" state could not have endured as  long a s  it did if it were not for 
Somoza's genius in coopting and rewarding, a s  well as intimidating, potential economic and 
political challengers. Within circumscribed limits the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was free to 
accumulate wealth, if not power, and for those willing to cooperate there could be substantial 
rewards. "Come, comernos," as another large cotton grower observed, "He eats, we eat." The 
large financial groups of BANIC and BANAMERICA ran their own financial empires and where 
their interests overlapped with Somoza's, a s  in sugar for example, cooperative arrangements were 
worked out (Wheelock 1978, pp. 184-185). With the bourgeoisie the Somozas always perferred a 
deal to direct political confrontation, although no such consideration was extended to challenges 
from below. 
One prominent coffee grower describes the Somoza treatment as follows: 
Well, my father and Somoza were neighbors and "Tachito" [Somoza Debaylel used 
to drop by my office all the time to talk. He was always interested in whatever 
new business seemed to develop. So if he heard I was involved in'rice he would 
drop by and say, "Roberto, the rice business is wonderful. It has  a great future -- 
we should plant thousands of acres." And he would want to get involved in a joint 
venture. And I would say, "Tachito, that's a great idea. Why don't you pursue it 
and I will continue my business." Or he would hear that  I was involved in castor 
oil and he would come by and say, "Castor oil is a great business -- all the airplane 
parts will need lubrication and castor oil demand will be terrific." And I would say, 
"Sounds like a great opportunity for you, Tachito." But I wouldn't get involved. 
This grower, who maintained foreign citizenship, avoided any business or political involvement 
with Somoza and also observed a family tradition, dating to the beginning of the century, of strict 
political neutrality. For less diplomatic and socially prominent figures the Somoza "treatment" 
could be more abrupt. As a cotton grower notes: 
He took my father's ranch. My father was a rancher with an excellent farm with 
extremely high milk yields. And someone from the Guard came and told him, 
"Somoza wants to buy your farm. Sign!" 
Q. Did he pay a reasonable price? 
A. He didn't even pay for the value of the cows he  took, let alone the farm. I t  was 
robbery pure and simple. 
Q. Did that  sort of thing happen in cotton? 
A. Well it was more common in the cattle areas around Boaco and Chontales -- 
excellent area  for cattle. Somoza forced many people to sell. And in the rice 
growing area around Granada. 
But Somoza's most effective tactic was coopting his political opponents through 
arrangements of shared political and economic power. As the same grower explains: 
He was involved [in cotton]. The Argiiellos, for example. They as  much as 
3,500 manzanas [actually over 11,0001 before the revolution and they were 
political opponents of Somoza. So he forced a deal with them so he became a 
partner with them. That's the way the system worked. 
The periodic "elections" held during the Somoza e ra  were preceded by arrangements 
between the major Liberal and Conservative Party factions guaranteeing preference and power to 
all involved in exchange for continued Sultanic dominance for the Somozas. The resulting election 
was a stage-managed farce. As another cotton grower and life-long member of the Conservative 
Party described one of the two occasions he voted: 
... there was no point in it, the elections. You already knew who was going to win. 
Peasants were trucked to the polls and handed a ballot with a picture of Somoza 
and his opponent, and the election official smiles and places a pen on the picture of 
Somoza and says, "We all know who you are  going to vote for." I demanded a 
secret ballot but i t  made little difference. .They knew I would vote against Somoza. 
The financial arrangements and electoral manipulation allowed some prominent members 
of the agrarian bourgeoisie access to the spoils of the Somoza system. But the tension between 
those inside and outside the charmed circle was always a potential source of instability. Somoza's 
success in the political economy of cooptation split both the Liberal and Conservative Parties and 
left the bourgeoisie and indeed the political opposition without effective political representation. In 
1970 after the leader of the Conservative Party announced still another pact with Somoza, this 
time for the 1974 elections, one prominent Conservative, Pedro Joaquin Charnorro, editor of 
Nicaragua's leading daily newspaper, L a  Prensa, resigned from the Conservative Party in disgust 
to form his own Authentic Conservative Party and organize a boycott of the elections (Weber 
1985, p. 39). The boycott in turn led to the formation, in 1974, of the Democratic Liberation 
Union (UDEL) led by Chamorro and including much of the splintered bourgeois political opposition, 
the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Communist) and two labor federations (Weber, U.; Lopez &Acl. 
1980, pp. 88-89; Vilas 1986, pp. 132-133). It also set  Chamorro on a course that  would 
eventually lead him to confrontation with the dynasty, leadership of the bourgeois opposition, and, 
eventually, to his death. UDEL was typical of the & hQc political coalitions and interest groups 
which, in the absence of effective political parties, came to represent the bourgeois opposition in the 
revolutionary crisis (Gilbert 1987, Chapter 5, pp. 5-6). 
Another consequence of the absence of effective political representation was a series of 
armed attacks often led by prominent political opponents of the regime but involving neither a 
coherent party structure nor mass political support. Armed actions against the regime took place 
in 1948, 1954, 1958 (two attacks), 1959, and 1967 (Weber 1985, p. 32). The most spectacular of 
these, a t  Olama and 10s Mollejones in 1959, was led by the same Pedro Joaquin Chamorro who 
later organized UDEL (Gilbert 1987, Chapter 5, p. 4; Black 1981, p. 42). To some in the 
bourgeois opposition these attacks seemed the only route to political change. As a prominent coffee 
grower who actively supported the Sandinistas notes: 
... there were others who supported the Conservatives or Independent Liberals 
against Somoza, but I thought that  only armed action would overthrow Somoza. 
But I was wrong. In the end the people got rid of Somoza -- a mass uprising which 
he didn't have the guns -- i t  was impossible -- to control. 
Another prominent coffee grower described how he had gone into the hills for six months in one of 
the many inconclusive armed actions before the formation of the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN). He survived the experience and returned to assume the life of an amuent planter. 
Another Conservative Somoza opponent interviewed said he had been jailed on several occasions 
but remained steadfast in his contempt for the regime despite his current disillusionment with the 
revolution. Short of military action there seemed no way to penetrate the Sultanic state. As 
Sequeira (quoted in Midlarsky and Roberts 1985, p. 183) notes: 
... the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was never a ruling class. There was virtually no 
correlation between political power and economic power in Nicaraguan society. The 
bourgeoisie was left to its sole interest, increasing its wealth. 
As long a s  the bourgeoisie attended to the business of business it could count on the 
National Guard to insure labor tranquility and freedom from squatters and other inconvenient 
manifestations of peasant discontent. As FSLN leader Bayardo Arce (quoted in Invernizzi, Pisani, 
and Ceberio 1986, p. 180) notes: 
At the hour of the strike the manager or owner called the National Guard. The 
Guard came and beat up the workers and that  was that. There was no way to 
make a mistake. 
Or as a staff member of a producers' organization observed: 
You could always count on the government to deal with land invasions. 
The web of political entanglements and consistent support for bourgeois property tied the 
bourgeoisie to the Somoza state. And the Guard succeeded in putting down dissident members of 
the bourgeoisie or anyone else who failed to accept the rules of the game. 
The interaction of the Sultanic state with a dependent agro-export economy created by the 
1970s a tripartite bourgeoisie. At  its core, of course, was the armed bourgeoisie of the Somoza 
dynasty itself. The grand bourgeoisie of the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups formed a second 
economically competitive faction linked to Somoza by a complex web of coercion and cooptation. 
Below these core groups was a much larger group which Gilbert (1987, Chapter 5, pp. 2-3) calls 
the "middle bourgeoisie," and L o p e z & ~ l .  (1980, p. 85) call the "medium local bourgeoisie." Most 
if not all the large coffee growers, with the exception of Calley Dagnall, Baltodano, other large 
exporters and, of course, Somoza fell in this group. Many cotton growers did as well although the 
large cotton growers like the Argiiellos or the Gurdian or Mantica were integrated in either the 
Somoza or opposing BANIC and BANAMERICA groups. I t  was overwhemingly this "middle 
bourgeoisie" which moved away from the Sultanic state in the revolutionary crisis of the 1970s 
and it is a portion of this class fraction only which survived the revolution to continue production in 
Sandinista Nicaragua. The BANIC and BANAMERICA groups remained aloof from the struggles 
and indeed many of their members were caught in the Somozas' web of political and economic 
obligation (Gilbert 1987, Chaper 5, pp. 5-6; Lopez&d.  1980, pp. 85-93; Black 1981, p. 65). 
Although a few members of the grand bourgeoisie, generally those who had avoided the Somoza 
embrace, survived the revolution or even aided i t  most were swept away by the revolution itself or 
the confiscation of the properties of "Somocistas" which followed. 
Table 1 presents the contrasting fates of two bourgeois families in the revolution; one, the 
Argiiellos, closely tied to the Somoza system, and the other, the Bolaiios, in opposition and allied 
politically with the middle bourgeoisie. Table 1 also presents a portrait of the enterprise structure 
of the cotton industry in the pre-revolutionary period. Since all cotton growers (but coffee 
growers) have been obliged to register their annual plantings since the Somoza period, i t  is possible 
to construct a detailed portrait of land ownership patterns. I n  the case of the Bolaiios family, who 
remain in Nicaragua, information from the official registry has  been augmented by data kindly 
supplied by Nicolas ~ o l a i i o s . ~  The Argiiello holdings are an approximation based on the 
assumption that  holdings of 200 rnanzanas or more listed under the Argiiello patronym are 
controlled by members of the family. The Bolaiios listing includes all holdings whether or not they 
are listed in the family's patronym. 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
The Bolaiios cotton plant ing~ amounted to almost 5,000 m a n z a n a  before and only slightly 
less after the revolution, although one of their most important holdings, 3ervicio Agricola 
Industrial M a s a s  (SAIMSA), was confiscated in June 1985 in an incident that  gained 
international attention (New York T i m a  June 18, 1985, p. 7). The four Bolaiios brothers 
(Alejandro, Enrique, Josd Domingo, and Nicolas) managed an  economic empire that  included coffee 
estates (one for each of the brothers), cattle lands, a 20,000 bale cotton gin owned by SAIMSA, a 
. . 
crop dusting firm, Aeroserviclos 10s Altos U (ALASA), with eight aircraft, landing strips, and 
ground facilities, a substantial quantity of agricultural equipment (tractors, harvesters, etc.) as 
well as other lands not planted in cotton (and thus not shown in Table 1). Although less 
information is available for the Argiiellos it is clear from the size of their officially listed holdings 
reported in Table 1 that  this was an even larger economic empire. 
The Argiiellos were confiscated as Somocistas immediately after the revolution and by 
1983-84 only one holding of 200 m a n z a n a  or more was listed under their name and it is a 
corporate holding whose street address indicates that  it is currently managed by the firm of 
Gurdian (MIDINRA 1983, p. 5). The Bolaiios not only managed to keep their holdings intact (at 
least until the loss of SAIMSA in 1985) but planted almost a s  much cotton in 1983-84 as  they had 
in 1975-76 even though the cotton area a s  a whole declined sharply after the revolution. The 
divergent fates of these two families reflect their political positions in the revolution and their 
structural positions in the pre-revolutionary class structure. Enrique Bolaiios is now president of 
the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) and h a s  emerged as one of the principal 
spokesmen of the internal bourgeois opposition.3 His brother Nicolas is now president of the 
National Union of Coffee Growers of Nicaragua (UNCAFENIC) which is affiliated with the Union 
of Agricultural Producers of Nicaragua (UPANIC). He is also a member of the board of directors 
of the National Institute for Nicaraguan Development (INDE). Both UPANIC and INDE are in 
turn member organizations of COSEP. As Nicolas Bolaiios himself observed, "All I seem to do 
these days is go to meetings." 
The Bolaiios a re  representative of and, indeed, emerged as leaders of the middle bourgeois 
opposition in post- a s  well as pre-revolutionary Nicaragua. COSEP became the most important 
organization of the anti-Somoza middle bourgeoisie during the pre-revolutionary period (Gilbert 
1987, Chapter 5, p. 5; Lopez&_ail. 1980, pp. 89-90; Vilas 1986, pp. 144-145). The organization 
was founded as  COSIP (the name was changed in 1979 by substituting "Enterprise" for the 
original "Initiative") in 1974 in response to the economic and political dislocations caused by the 
1972 earthquake and Somoza's rapacious response to reconstruction. Many leaders of COSIP had 
been associated with INDE founded in 1963 by young entrepreneurs encouraged by the United 
States Agency for International Development and assisted by AID funds (Wheelock 1978, pp. 152- 
153). Both INDE and COSIP shared the goals of the Alliance of Progress for economic 
development under democratic and anti-Communist auspices and this has  been the consistent 
position of these organizations ever since. The proliferation of bourgeois associations (UDEL, 
COSEP, INDE, etc.) is another consequence of party decomposition and deligitimation under the 
Sultanic state. These organizations remained the primary vehicles of bourgeois opposition both 
before and after the revolution. The Bolaiios, leaders of COSEP and INDE, represent the upper or 
leading s t ra ta  of the middle bourgeois opposition. 
The Argiiellos, closely tied to Somoza interests and to the compromised faction of the 
Conservative Party, represent the bourgeoisie which stayed with the regime and was destroyed by 
the revolution. The contrast between the social and economic origins of the two families is 
striking. The Argiiellos, descendants of Pedro de Alvarado, Conqueror of Guatemala and Bernal 
Diaz, chronicler of Cortez's conquest of Mexico, were one of the great families of the colonial and 
independence periods &vista Conservadora 1967, pp. 1-2). Jose Argiiello Arce was already listed 
a s  one of the principal merchants in the Conservative capital of Granada in 1871 (Sanabria 1988, 
p. 53) and the family was prominent in Nicaraguan society and conservative politics throughout 
the Somoza period. Leonardo Argiiello was elected President in 1947 but removed from office and 
exiled when he tried to remove Somoza as head of the National Guard. As Table 1 makes clear 
the family is tied by marriage and partnerships to a number of the most distinguished 
Conservative families (Sacasa, Cardenal) and to other major cotton producing houses (Gurdian, 
Mantica). Anastasio Somoza Garcia was in turn married to Salvadora Debayle Sacasa and his 
daughter Lilian was married to Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Nicaraguan ambassador to the United 
States and for many years dean of the Washington diplomatic corps. And as the interview with a 
well informed Leon planter indicates Somoza was a silent partner in the Argiiellos' cotton 
business. The web of economic, political, and family ties between the Argiiellos and the Somozas 
demonstrates how the Sultanic state enmeshed even i ts  nominal Conservative opponents. 
The Bolaiios Geyer family had i ts  origins in nineteenth and twentieth century European 
immigration to Central America. The Bolaiios family migrated from Spain to Central America in 
the nineteenth century and Enrique Geyer, the brothersy maternal grandfather, was a German 
engineer who arrived in Nicaragua early in this century. Alejandro Bolaiios, the brothers' 
paternal grandfather, was a medical doctor who bought a small coffee farm in 1914. His son, 
Nicolas, was a minor planter and hardware store owner who also ran a dairy business. The four 
brothers began their rise to economic prominence only in 1964 when they planted cotton for the 
first time. After surviving near bankruptcy caused by the destruction of their Managua real 
estate holdings in the 1972 earthquake they planted extensively in the critical year 1973 when, a s  
brother Enrique correctly anticipated, cotton prices boomed as a consequence of a run up in 
synthetic fiber prices caused by petrochemical shortages during the first oil embargo. The year 
1973 made their fortune and by 1975-76 when they appear in the listing in Table 1 they had 
become the eighth largest cotton growers in Nicaragua. The Bolaiios brothers a re  typical of the 
new fortunes created by a cotton boom which dramatically expanded the ranks of the bourgeoisie 
in general and the middle bourgeoisie in particular. They remained in political opposition to 
Somoza and, according to Nicolas, they managed to avoid any economic and political connections 
with the regime. After the loss of their Managua real estate holdings they held no important non- 
agricultural investments and were not involved in either the BANIC or BANAMERICA groups. 
This structural position and their association with COSEP clearly places them in the middle 
bourgeoisie although they are  among its wealthiest members. 
Victor Robles and Jose' Mendez (not their real names) are representatives of the fraction of 
the middle bourgeoisie in coffee. Victor Robles is the owner of two estates with a total area of 
approximately 100 manzanzj in coffee. His annual production of 2,000 guintales ( 1  auintal = 
100 lbs.) or 200,000 lbs. places him among the fifty largest private growers in post-revolutionary 
Nicaragua, but the scale of his production is still small when compared to that  of the cotton barons 
or  of large coffee producers elsehwere in Central America. The Regalado Dueiias clan of El 
Salvador, for example, produced more than 85,000 winta les  or forty times as  much as  Seiior 
Robles before 1979 (Colindres 1976, p. 471). Calley Dagnall processed and exported more than 
90,000 quintales before the revolution although much of this did not come from their own estates 
(Sequeira 1981, p. 112). One of Victor Robles' estates was  inherited from his father and 
namesake who controlled roughly the same area in 1910 a s  his son does today. During the 1920s 
the estate was raided by Sandino's forces and the manor house and outbuildings were destroyed. 
His second estate was inherited from his mother who was a member of one of Matagalpa's best 
known families of nineteenth century German planters. His yields of approximately 20 
au in ta l~ lmanzana  mark him as a technically competent producer by Nicaraguan standards, but 
they are much lower than could be produced on his estates with modern techniques. He estimates 
that he could produce as much a s  8,000 wintales if he could get the manpower and technology to 
modernize. His workers, many of whom worked for his father, live on the estate where he 
provides subsistence plots for them (a paternalistic gesture which he continues even though 
technically it is in violation of the agrarian reform law). Although he lives in Matagalpa he visits 
his estates frequently and on the day of the interview was on the way there to pay his workers. 
He had been careful to change his departure time so as to confound payroll bandits who are a 
chronic problem in the region. A man of great personal dignity, aristocratic demeanor, and 
starchy independence, he was a determined Conservative opponent of Somoza. 
Jose' Mendez's coffee business was a product of the long-delayed development of the North 
Central coffee region which resumed only in the 1960s. Paralleling the rise of new export 
commodities, the coffee system itself began a period of expansion and technical transformation 
which made coffee in the sixties and seventies a "new export crop" as well. JosCYs father first 
tried to produce coffee in 1936-37 but was forced out in a property dispute which threatened to 
become violent. He went into cattle instead and did not try again in coffee until 1963. His timing 
could hardly have been better and he and his sons, including Jose', rapidly expanded their 
operation to over 200 rnanzanas of coffee almost all of i t  under relatively modern cultivation 
techniques. His pre-revolutionary production of 5,000 quintales made him one of Nicaragua's 
largest producers and his current production, although lower, still makes him one of the five 
largest producers in the North Central region. Even so, he is a small producer by the standards of 
Regalado Duefias or Calley Dagnall. Before the revolution he planned to expand production and 
believes he could have reached 8,000 auintalea, but has now shelved any expansion plans because 
of what he perceives as the political uncertainties of the present. Jose' directs the operations, 
assisted by his three brothers, and he is in day-to-day managerial control of the enterprise. The 
family built a dry processing plant, rare for Nicaraguan growers, which can process 30,000 
auintales. They planned to use the plant for their own expanded production as well a s  for coffee 
purchased from other growers. Jose' Mendez is a straightforward, intelligent businessman 
fascinated by the technical issues of production and processing and without aristocratic pretension. 
Victor Robles is a representative product of the 19th century coffee boom; Jose' Mendez of 
the mid-twentieth century transformation of the coffee economy. Along with Nicholas Bolaiios 
they are typical of the middle bourgeoisie in export agriculture which was excluded from the spoils 
of the Somoza system but was increasing in wealth and power immediately before the revolution. 
All the growers interviewed fall in this class fraction. It could hardly be otherwise since the grand 
bourgeoisie associated with Somoza were confiscated and only growers in opposition to the regime 
in 1979 were likely to survive the political pressures of post-1979 Nicaragua. Comparison of the 
1975-76 list of registered cotton growers (Nufiez no date, pp. 129-142) with the equivalent list for 
1983-84 (MIDINRA 1983) indicates that  therk were 109 patronymic family groups holding 200 
p a n z a n a s  or more in the former period, a typical pre-revolutionary year, but only 64 such family 
groups in the latter period. For very large growers the losses were even greater. There were 2 1  
family groups with 1,000 manzanas or more in 1975-76 but only 6 (including the Bolaiios) in 
1983-84. Clearly the heaviest losses were suffered by the grand bourgeoisie. The middle 
bourgeoisie in cotton, while diminished somewhat in numbers, is still a significant factor in post- 
revolutionary production. In coffee, according to data reported by Gariazzo &A. (1983, p. 7), 
there were 51 large growers in the North Central region with production of 1,500 p i n t a l e s  or 
more in 1977. In 1983-84, according to data from the National Development Bank, there were 21 
growers in this size category. Overall, these figures suggest that  the political and economic 
changes of the revolution reduced the ranks of the agrarian bourgeoisie by approximately one-half. 
But it is the surviving fraction, overwhelmingly from the middle bourgeoisie, which, according to 
most observers, opposed Somoza and supported the revolution. If they indeed supported the 
revolution the question raised by Anastasio Somoza Debayle in the quotation with which we began 
remains. Why would these aristocratic coffee planters and millionaire businessmen turn against a 
system that  had made them rich? 
The Agrarian Bourgeoisie in the Revolution 
There is little doubt concerning the sincerity and vigor of the growers' opposition to Somoza 
and the support of most, if not all, of them for the revolution. Although i t  might be assumed tha t  
. . 
growers in contemporary Nicaragua would claim enthusiastic support for the revolution in the 
interests of currying favor with the government almost the exact opposite is the case. As one 
grower explained: 
There is fear. Because today to say something bad about Somoza implies 
supporting the Sandinistas. The & (ears), we used to call them under Somoza 
-- now we call them sa~os (toads) will hear so people are afraid to tell you the 
.truth. 
Indeed most growers were reluctant to talk about the  Somoza period and did so only in 
response to persistent questioning. The consequences of collaboration with the Sandinistas for 
members of this class could be grave. Of the six members of the Sandinista producers' 
organization, the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG) interviewed, three had been 
directly affected by counter-revolutionary terror. One had lost her husband who was tortured to 
death at their farm by contra raiders. A second lost his father and brother in a payroll robbery 
with political overtones, and a third narrowly escaped a n  ambush by contra forces the day before 
the interview. Even the one neutral who refused to join any producers' organization had been 
attacked by the contras, losing his entire herd of 600 cattle in a raid. &mg of the anti-government 
growers had any similar experiences. Nevertheless almost all growers expressed vehement 
opposition to Somoza and enthusiastic support for the revolution of 1979. The following comments 
are typical: 
The Sandinistas came to power with the aid of business and could not have done it 
without them. Everyone, coffee growers included, wanted to overthrow Somoza. 
Everyone opposed Somoza. Everyone -- the coffee growers, the peasants, the 
workers, businessmen, everyone got together to throw him out. 
I t  was a tyranny. He [Somoza] got involved in everything. And the corruption 
was terrible. But Somoza was an angel compared to these guys [the FSLN 
directorate]. 
We all supported the revolution. It was a wonderful thing. We still support it. But 
not what they are  doing now. 
Only one or two of the growers expressed any sympathy for the Somoza regime or 
remained non-committal. The opposition often went beyond simple expression of opinion. Many of 
the growers gave money to the FSLN and argued that  this was not uncommon among their 
friends. Others did much more. One grower actively aided the party, allowed his palatial villa to 
be used as  a safe house for prominent party leaders, was arrested by Somoza and released from 
prison only after one of the FSLN's spectacular hostage exchanges with Somoza. Another 
narrowly escaped arrest when a National Guard unit nearly caught several prominent party 
leaders, including a t  least one member of the current FSLN national directorate, in his town 
house. Fortunately, for both the revolutionaries and the grower, the leaders were able to escape 
by climbing over the roof before the Guard broke in. Other growers allowed weapons to be stored 
on their estates or hid rebel units during the final offensive maintaining a complicated double life to 
avoid detection by the Guard. Although such direct and often dangerous support for the rebels 
was not typical, financial support was  much more common, and ideological opposition almost 
universal. 
The growers were well aware of the ideology and objectives of the revolutionary party they 
were supporting. This ideology, of course, included the bourgeoisie in general and the agrarian 
bourgeoisie in particular a s  one of its chief targets (Hodges 1986, p. 214; Gilbert 1987, p. 20). 
When asked about the apparent contradiction between the FSLN position and the growers' support 
for the revolution, most growers indicated that  they hoped more moderate forces would prevail in 
the end. During the revolution the dominant "Third" faction (tercerista~) of the FSLN had 
proposed a national unity alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie based on a program of non- 
alignment, democratic pluralism, and a mixed economy. This position, including alliance with the 
FSLN, was supported by "h b," a group of twelve prominent business and professional men 
including members of the Mantica (cotton) and Baltodano (coffee) families. It was also the position 
of the first post-revolutionary Government of National Reconstruction which included among its 
members Violeta Chamorro, wife of slain L a  Prensa editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and Alfonso 
Robelo Callejas, a millionaire cotton seed oil manufacturer, member of the cotton aristocracy, and 
leader of the Western cotton growers (Gilbert 1987, Chapter 5, pp. 9-10; Christian 1986, p. 151; 
Hodges 1986, pp. 214-217; Black 1981, p. 115). It remains the official position of the Nicaraguan 
government to this day even though the government was  reorganized under FSLN control after 
the resignations of Chamorro and Robelo in May 1980. The complicated balancing act involved in 
the growers' position is evident in the interviews: 
... i t  was always clear that  they [the FSLN] were Marxist-Leninists. I supported 
the revolution but we hoped that  other groups might gain power and we might have 
real democracy. But it didn't happen. 
Q. What did you think of the Sandinistas before the  revolution? 
A. We hoped that  we could believe what they said. We knew their positions but 
believed that  they supported ~Q,S Doce. So we hoped that  there would be a 
democratic system. 
Q. What did you think of the Sandinistas in this period? 
A. Well, we basically believed the charter of-Punta Arenas [July 12, 19791 when 
they supported democracy. The period of the revolution, the first government with 
Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo. But after tha t  they changed and we found 
out it was all lies. 
Q. What did you think of the Sandinistas before the revolution? 
A. I thought they were wonderful. I thought they were doves but they turned out 
to be toads. 
The interviews make clear that  this fraction of the Nicaraguan agrarian bourgeoisie (a) supported 
the revolution and the national unity alliance with the FSLN, (b) knew perfectly well that  the 
party's position was opposed to their interests, and (c) hoped that  the contradiction between (a) 
and (b) would somehow resolve itself in their favor. The anomalous position of the Nicaraguan 
agrarian bourgeoisie was based on neither neutrality nor ignorance. 
How can this strange revolutionary alliance be explained? It has  become conventional 
wisdom (although Vilas 1986, p. 91 is a notable dissenter) to assert that  the gathering world 
economic crisis, manifest in Nicaragua in a rapid accumulation of foreign debt, increasing prices 
for petroleum and other agricultural inputs, fiscal deficits, and increased taxation, was a 
contributing factor in the radicalization of the bourgeoisie (see, among others, Nuiiez no date, pp. 
112-1 17; Lopez &A. 1980, pp. 56-58; Gilly 1980, pp. 93-94; Black 1981, pp. 66-68; Weber 1981, 
p. 26; Williams 1986, pp. 161-163; and Paige 1985, p. 104). Indeed this was the working 
hypothesis of the author when he arrived in Nicaragua and the interviews included detailed 
questioning on the pre-revolutionary economic situation of the growers. The hypothesis seemed 
reasonable since it is based on the common assumption tha t  class interest and class consciousness 
can be derived directly from economic interest. Whatever the merits of this explanation for 
understanding the behavior of vulnerable lower class groups in an  economic crisis, i t  does not 
correspond with the growers' reports of their own economic situation. In fact the 1970s in general 
and the two years before the revolution in particular were times of unprecedented commodity 
prices with coffee at four times and cotton a t  three times their price levels in 1970 (Williams 1986, 
p. 207). Oil and petrochemical prices also increased dramatically but this fact alone does not 
constitute a crisis since labor is a large percentage of the costs in both crops and Nicaraguan coffee 
was less dependent on imported agro-chemicals and petroleum. And for large growers favorable 
prices on bulk purchases were usually available. As one large cotton grower observes: 
We felt little pressure from pesticide prices since we could buy in bulk and demand 
preferential treatment. We were always volume buyers. 
Furthermore, a s  Swezey and Daxl (no date, pp. 12-13) note: 
Some of the more prosperous cotton families also had major financial interests in 
pesticide distributing firms, and had even bought the rights to registered 
trademarks or formulations, a s  well as built infrastructure such as  landing strips 
and warehouses to provide aerial spray services. 
I n  fact, a s  was noted above, the first oil shock actually made the fortune of the Bolaiios brothers. 
It is entirely possible that  a large number of small and medium coffee and cotton growers were 
caught in an  economic crisis (none of them, of course, was interviewed for this study), but this was 
certainly not the way the large growers interviewed saw the situation. The growers reported no 
difficulty with either the price or the supply of agricultural inputs nor with prices available for 
export products. Those growers who discussed the general economic situation in the immediate 
pre-revolutionary situation pronounced i t  excellent. The following comments are typical: 
Q. Were inputs available at reasonable prices? 
A. Yes, there was no problem. They were readily available. There was 
considerable choice and you could get excellent quality. They were much cheaper 
than they are now. 
Q. You could find more than one place to buy inputs here in [place name]? 
A. No, we bought in Managua. There was much competition. There were Swiss 
companies, German, English, American. The competition kept the price down. 
There was a completely free market. 
Q. Could you tell me about the Somoza period -- the economic conditions? 
A. Economic conditions? Well, there was a free market. We basically got a free 
market price in dollars and usually it was reasonable. It was profitable. There 
wasn't any problem with spare parts. You just went to the next corner and there 
were several places you could buy them. There was no problem with inputs. 
Q. What about processing plants? Difficulties with adverse prices? 
A. The price was the international price. We sold cherry coffee [i.e., unprocessed] 
to the processing plants. There were processing plants, wet and dry in [place 
name]. There were a number of processing plants and competition kept prices 
reasonable. We now sell to one buyer ENCAFE [the national coffee board]. 
It was fantastic -- the business climate! 
It should be kept in mind tha t  these a re  comments by what are, by Nicaraguan standards, 
large growers. The smallest cotton grower in the sample described a very different experience and 
complained bitterly about the role of the commercial houses in general and Gurdian in particular 
who, he said, wouldn't take the business of anyone with less than 10,000 guintales; offered him 
half the world price; advanced money to cover costs at exorbitant interest rates; and tried to 
foreclose on his father's farm when the family was  unable to make payments. His father stood 
down the house of Gurdian with a shotgun. But this grower, a n  activist in the Sandinista 
producers' organization UNAG, was atypical. More representative was a grower who, when asked 
* 
if he had had any difficulties with prices paid by cotton gins, pointed out that  he was a partner in 
the largest cotton gin in Central America and proudly drove the author out to the plant for a visit. 
Whatever merit the financial crisis theory may have for small and medium farmers i t  does not 
apply to the agrarian middle bourgeoisie. 
A second economic interest argument advanced by some of the same analysts (Black 1981, 
pp. 64-65; Weber 1981, p. 33; Williams 1986, p. 168) involves "unfair competition" (cornpetencia 
desk!), a phrase increasingly used after the 1972 earthquake to describe the Somozas' coercive 
interference in legitimate business. Although this was in fact a major complaint of middle 
bourgeois interest groups (Vilas 1986, p. 131; Gilbert 1987, Chapter 5, p. 6) almost all growers 
interviewed reported that  they themselves had had no problems with Somoza and many denied 
vehemently that  he had interfered in any way in cotton or coffee: 
Q. So they more or less left you alone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I have heard that  the Somozas interfered in business. Was tha t  true? 
A. Not in coffee. The Somozas got their s tar t  in coffee here in Carazo. And 
Somoza's brother was involved in the commercialization of the product. But 
basically he had different interests and didn't involve himself in coffee. 
Q. Did Somoza interfere in cotton? 
A. No, not really. I don't think he could understand cotton -- i t  was too 
complicated for him. He had a cotton gin and he  exported cotton, but no, he didn't 
get involved. He did establish a 10 percent export tax after the earthquake, but 
that  was reasonable -- except that  he stole all the money. 
Somoza left the coffee growers strictly alone. No coffee estates were confiscated in 
the epoch of Somoza Debayle -- it may have been possible in the epoch of Somoza 
Garcia. 
Somoza never interfered in coffee cultivation or confiscated estates. Coffee growers 
were not confiscated by Somoza. 
The confiscation of German estates was either too far removed historically or seen a s  an  
exception based on foreign nationality. No grower mentioned it. And no coffee or cotton grower 
reported any threats to confiscate his estate or attempts to interfere in his business in any other 
way. The one grower whom Somoza visited on occasion to propose business deals denied that the 
dictator had ever threatened him and described Somoza's attitude as "strictly business." Nor did 
the growers see Somoza as a threat to the properties of cotton or coffee growers generally even 
though the case of the Argiiellos was well known in Leon. The only grower who reported a direct 
threat against a member of his family was a cotton grower whose father had lost his dairy farm in 
a forced sale (see p. 12 above). But the grower's father was in dairying, not cotton. In fact the 
Somozas' major agricultural interests were in dairy, beef cattle, rice, and sugar, not cotton nor, 
with the notable exception of the German estates, in coffee. So whatever the merits of the unfair 
competition hypothesis for businessmen more directly exposed to the Somoza embrace, enthusiasm 
for the revolution among these coffee and cotton growers was not based on fear of confiscation or 
direct competition in their industry. As one coffee grower observed: 
You know it's paradoxical. We had complete [economic] freedom in the midst of a 
dictatorship and now we have no freedom a t  all. 
Economic self-interest in general is not an  adequate explanation of the growers' opposition 
to Somoza and support for the revolution, and no amount of questioning along these lines revealed 
any economic problems sufficient to explain the growers' defection from a regime which had in any 
case faithfully defended their economic interests. As another grower explained 
Q. So you didn't have any problems with credit, exports, ginning ... ? 
A. No, not a t  all. The objection to Somoza was global not specific. The cotton 
growers -ed Somoza as citizens not a s  cotton mowers [author's italics]. 
When asked directly why coffee and cotton growers like themselves opposed Somoza the 
growers emphasized two &neral themes: (1) corruption and underdevelopment, and (2) tyranny 
and the absence of democracy. These themes in fact accurately reflect positions taken by COSEP, 
INDE, UDEL, and other bourgeois interest groups in the 1970s and during the revolution itself. 
The middle bourgeois interest groups consistently demanded an honest, efficient administration 
which would make economic development under capitalist auspices possible. The following demand 
(quoted in L o p e z d a l .  1980, p. 357) by the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a n  alliance of middle 
bourgeois interest groups, traditional bourgeois opposition party fractions, and the pro-Sandinista 
10s Doce, is typical: 
Eradication of the corruption which has characterized the Somoza dictatorship, the 
fraudulent appropriation of goods, contraband, illicit tax exemptions, fraudulent 
bidding, forced advantage in the sale of lands, misappropriation of state funds, 
illicit processing of loans, unjust commissions on loans and other dirty business. 
Or  in the words of the coffee and cotton growers in this sample: 
Q. What were the greatest problems with Somoza? 
A. Corruption. A few allies of Somoza doing all the business -- getting all the land, 
having all the political power. Somoza did nothing for the poor. We are  a poor 
country. 
... he got involved in everything. And the corruption was terrible. 
He treated the assets of the state a s  his personal possession. The corruption was 
unsustainable. 
They had been in charge of the country for fifty years and had done nothing to 
develop the country. 
He was like an alcoholic who goes on the wagon and then takes another drink and 
loses all control. After the earthquake he wanted to be in every business. He 
wanted to control everything. And a lot of people resented it ... it really wasn't 
unfair competition but people thought i t  was. 
In the same list of demands the F A 0  also appealed for the establishment of a democratic 
system with constitutional guarantees of civil and human rights: 
Installation of a new political order which will guarantee a truly free electoral 
process at both the municipal and national level and the organization and function 
of all political parties without ideological discrimination of any kind. 
The growers, faithful representatives of the middle bourgeoisie, wanted the same thing: 
Q. Why then do you think so many growers supported the revolution? Were 
opposed to Somoza? 
A. Well he was a dictator for fifty years and we wanted a democratic system. 
And we wanted equality. 
Q. But why if economic conditions were so good did you oppose Somoza? 
A. Because i t  was a dictatorship. The same family controlling everything for fifty 
years. But things are much worse now. 
The revolution has changed from the original revolution that  threw out Somoza. 
We all had hope that  we would have a democratic society. How do you say i t  in 
English -- we've been had. 
As the quotations indicate, what the growers found objectionable in the old regime was the 
corruption and backwardness of the Sultanic state. What they wanted in the words of Carlos 
Vilas (1986, p. 132) was "...a modern capitalist state tha t  would eficiently perform its political- 
economic functions." What the growers had in mind seemed to be a n  idealized version of the 
United States which many of them said they looked to, then and now, as a potential ally. 
Although the growers and the middle bourgeoisie had a class based vision of an alternative political 
order i t  was not a vision that, necessarily, led them to revolutionary action. No interest group 
representing bourgeois interests took an  open stand against the dictatorship until the first 
proclamation of 10s Doce on October 21, 1977 (Vilas 1986, p. 135). COSIP did not call for direct 
action against the dictatorship until January 1978. And of course, many of the middle bourgeois 
interest groups, particularly producers' organizations, were not, as has been noted, formed until 
the revolution was underway -- the cotton growers' organizations in August 1978, the Union of 
Agricultural Producers of Nicaragua in early 1979, and the Association of Coffee Growers of 
Matagalpa, after the revolution, on August 2, 1979. Although the majority of the growers 
supported the position of 10s Doce in favor of alliance with the FSLN during the revolutionary 
crisis, bourgeois representatives consistently argued for the removal of Somoza and a transition to 
democratic rule in which the social and economic order, including in some form the National 
Guard, would somehow remain intact (Christian 1986, pp. 81-100; Vilas 1986, pp. 131-143). 
There was no place in the Sultanic state for the democratic aspirations and development agenda of 
the agrarian bourgeoisie. There is no doubt that  the groAwers interviewed were and are delighted 
that  Somoza is gone. The growers might have joined a revolution if they had had a coherent 
political organization, which they did not; had been in desperate economic straits, which they most 
certainly were not; and had they lacked the economic freedom that  they all said they had. Under 
the circumstances i t  is not difficult to see why the growers did not join the revolution earlier. The 
problem is why they joined i t  a t  all. 
Revolution, Repression and Bourgeois Radicalism 
With only two notable exceptions of the growers reported any experience of or worry 
about political repression in one of the world's most repressive political systems. The exceptions 
are  one of the two growers who advocated armed insurrection against Somoza and the one 
inflexible conservative who went to jail rather than accept a Somoza deal. There is little doubt 
that  first-hand experience of the dark side of the Somozas' Nicaragua was a radicalizing 
experience. I t  led one of these two men to ally himself with the FSLN years before the revolution. 
But these experiences, important as they were, were not typical. More representative was the 
wealthy young planter who fought Somoza in the hills for six months and then resumed the 
administration of his estate and his place in society. Although Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was jailed 
after the Olama and 10s PI'Iollejones raid, he was eventually released and was able to resume 
publication of ,La P r e n u .  As a prominent banker interviewed by Dennis Gilbert (1987, Chapter 5, 
p. 8) observed, "One does not kill people of a certain social condition." The murder of Pedro 
Joaquin Chamorro on January 10, 1978 violated this norm and is marked as  a turning point in 
relations between the bourgeoisie and the state by almost all observers (Black 1981, p. 107; Gilly 
1980, p. 84; Weber 1981, pp. 40-41; Christian 1986, p. 343; Vilas 1986, p. 136; Gilbert 1987, 
Chapter 5, p. 8). It dramatically changed the implicit rules of the game which exempted unarmed 
bourgeois opponents from dictatorial violence. But the breakdown of the Sultanic state went much 
deeper and dramatically affected the lives of most Nicaraguans including many of the growers 
interviewed. 
After the declaration of a state of siege on December 28, 1974 indiscriminate repression 
increased markedly as Somoza desperately struggled to maintain his rule. As George Black (1981, 
p. 89) observes, "The number of those who died in the 33 month state of siege can never be 
calculated but 3,000 is a frequent estimate." Most of the victims were poor peasants or the 
residents of urban shantytowns. The repression did not touch the bourgeoisie until very late but i t  
created a n  atmosphere of violent disorder and political instability that  threatened the position of 
the bourgeoisie more than any economic crisis could have done. As the repression increased 
manifestos issued by middle bourgeois interest groups, even before the assassination of Chamorro, 
are filled not with economic complaints but with desperate pleas for an end to the disorder that 
was threatening everyone. The first proclamation of hi Doc? (reproduced in Leiken and Rubin 
1987, p. 172) begins with a paragraph deploring the escalating violence and warning that: 
... if no other approaches toward a true solution a re  sought, the alternative will be 
war, with its grim and unpredictable consequences of loss of life and great damage 
to the national economy. 
The same theme is evident in news releases from middle bourgeois interest groups (reproduced in 
Lopez e$ a1. 1980, pp. 147, 150). INDE warns in a news release of October 24, 1977: 
Worried by the deterioration of public order and increased bloodshed ... 
That is affecting the normal development of economic, social and educational 
activities ... 
Creating a state of uncertainty and confusion in the  country ... 
The "Manifesto of Chinandega" (western cotton zone) signed by 62 businessmen led by cotton 
baron Alfonso Callejas Deshon, October 26, 1977, states that  they are: 
Deeply worried by the evident instability with overtones of warfare 
...p ropose realization of a national dialogue, broad, pluralistic, immediate. 
And in the end the repression and disorder touched even the privileged members of the agrarian 
bourgeoisie as the interviews indicate: 
Q. Was there a considerable problem for coffee growers with repression? 
A. Well when the uprising occurred, when the pressure increased, yes there was 
repression. But before that, no, not really. 
Q. Was the repression a reason for opposition? 
'. 
A. Well, in the end it affected everyone. The Guard searched this house twice 
looking for people. 
Q. Were you afraid of prison then? 
A. Everyone was afraid. 
Q. But you yourself were not active [in the revolution]? 
A. Not directly, no. But we gave financial aid and we protected people. We let the 
Front [FSLN] use the farm as a base and loaned them trucks to transport their 
people. 
Q. That must have been dangerous. Did you have problems with the Guard? 
A. It was -- the problem was you had to be very careful to conceal i t  from the 
Guard. But they never found us  out. The problem was that  there were two sides 
and you were caught in the middle. When the Front came you aided them and the 
other side came -- you had to conceal things from them. We supported the 
revolution but not the extreme leftist elements in it. 
Q. The position of h h? 
A. Yes, not the extreme left. 
The grower interviewed whose life was touched most profoundly by the repression was 
Victor Robles. His son and a friend were machine gunned to death in the streets of Matagalpa by 
the Guard. The incident had begun as a routine security check and the Guard did not know a t  the 
time that  Robles' son had been working for the FSLN. His son's friend, however, panicked and 
ran. The Guard opened fire killing both instantly. A decade later there was still a tone of 
profound sadness in Victor Robles' voice as he described his son's lost potential: 
He was such a brilliant boy, brilliant. He won a national competition to study in 
Switzerland and then came back to Nicaragua and helped run the estate. He had 
been here for two years when he  was killed. He was 21 ... 
For the agrarian bourgeoisie much more was a t  stake than the price of coffee. As these 
quotations make clear the revolution made the bourgeoisie radical; a radical bourgeoisie did not 
make the revolution. They were a s  the grower said, "Caught in the middle" of a revolutionary 
crisis which threatened their lives as well a s  their fortunes. But as the same grower also said, 
they "aided" the FSLN and "concealed things" from the National Gaurd. When the moment of 
choice came the growers' contempt for the Sultanic state, in the end, was decisive. But the 
majority of large cotton and coffee growers, tied to this state and its interests, remained with the 
regime to the end. And even among those who opposed Somoza most came to the aid of the 
Sandinistas and the armed revolution late in the crisis and did so only when pressed to choose 
sides in a situation where neutrality was increasingly difficult. That in the end some growers 
sided with the revolution against their natural allies in the ruling classes profoundly weakened 
Somoza in his last battle, not so much for the aid they gave the revolution, but for the aid they 
failed to give to him. In El Salvador some coffee growers organized paramilitary death squads to 
contain revolution. In  Nicaragua some coffee growers hid the revolutionaries from Somoza's death 
squads. 
The growers joined the revolution, however, not because of objective class economic 
interests, but because of the absence of subjective class-based political organization. Nicaragua's 
peculiar economic and political history created a bourgeoisie without the kind of economic 
integration that  would have enabled it to act effectively as a class and without the political 
organization which would have translated class action into political power. Incapable of acting in 
their own name, they allowed others to act for them -- first Somoza and then the Sandinistas. 
Paradoxically this revolutionary vanguard party led not a proletariat, which hardly existed in 
Nicaragua, but rather significant non-proletarian sectors including, remarkably enough, a fraction 
of the middle agrarian bourgeoisie. The agrarian bourgeoisie in revolutionary Nicaragua is a case 
of history making a class, not a class making history. But, of course, this class was made or, 
more accurately, unmade out of conditions inherited from Nicaragua's own tragic history. The 
impulse to liberal revolution was weak but incipient class consciousness survived in the growers' 
vision of a liberal capitalist democracy in the midst of the Sultanic state. Class consciousness 
without class organization; a vanguard substituting itself for the bourgeoisie; bourgeois 
revolutionaries without a bourgeois revolution. The Nicaraguan revolution, as well a s  the 
Nicaraguan agrarian bourgeoisie, has some very peculiar characteristics. 
NOTES 
1. The list of producers to be interviewed was constructed by first interviewing officers and former 
officers of the major national and regional producers' organizations in coffee and cotton who were 
themselves large producers (6 producers). Both private and generally anti-government producers' 
organizations and the formally independent but generally pro-government National Union of 
Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG) were included. These officers and also staff members of the 
organizations were then asked to recommend others with whom the author should speak (9 
producers). This network was supplemented by names selected randomly from lists of registered 
cotton growers and from a list of large private producers prepared by the National Development 
Bank (and kindly provided by David Dye) (6 producers). Finally two producers, who were also 
officers of a private regional growers' association, were contacted through the recommendation of 
the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA) bringing the total 
number of association officers and former officers to 8. Five of the growers (including two officers) 
belonged to UNAG, one was a member of both UNAG and a private growers' association, one 
refused to join any organization, and all of the others were affiliated with private producers' 
organizations. Officers and members of both UNAG and private producers' organizations 
indicated that  almost all large growers were affiliated with private associations and only a handful 
with UNAG. Only large growers were interviewed. A large grower was defined as  a coffee 
grower who was producing or  had produced in the very recent past 1,500 auintales (1  guintd = 
100 lbs.) a year, or a cotton grower with 300 manzanas (1 manzana = .69 ha.) or more registered 
in the 1983-84 crop year. One cotton grower, however, was included even though he planted only 
150 manzanas, because he was a national representative of UNAG. 
With the exceptions of two growers who 6referred to speak in English, all interviews were 
conducted in Spanish by the author and transcribed from memory into conversational English 
immediately after the interview. The average time of a n  interview was slightly more than two 
hours. In order to protect the identities of those interviewed, identifying detail including place 
names and organizational affiliations have been omitted in the text. 
2. Nicolas Bolafios expressly permitted his name to be used by the author. 
3. Enrique Bolafios resigned as president of COSEP on September 10, 1988 (New York Times, 
September 11, 1988, p. 10). 
* 
Table 1. 
Cotton Holdings of 200 mz. or  more of the Bolaiios and Argiiello Families 1975-1976 and 1983-1984 
Holdinzs Listed Under Patronpm Mz. Holdin~s  Listed Under Patronym 
Bolaiios, Enrique. Hnos. y Cia. Ltda. 578 Bolafios, Enrique. Hnos. y Cia. Ltda. 
Bolaiios, Nicolas. Sucesores S.A. 1,122 Bolafios, Nicolas. Sucesores S.A. 
300 Bolaiios Geyer, Jos4 Domingo 
Bolaiios, Anita Vega de 200 
Bolafios Geyer, Nicolas 
Bolaiios, Regina Chamorro 
Bolaiios, Lila Abaunza 
Other Holdinm 
Abaunza Davis Torre S.A. 
Agropecuario "El Raiz6nW S.A. 
SAIMSA 
Other Holdings 
Abaunza Davis Torre S.A. 
Agropecuario "El Raizon" S.A. 
SAIMSA 
Agricola Jos6 Gregorio S.A. 
Productores del Algod6n S.A. 
Chamorro Agricola S.A. 
H o l d i n ~ s  Listed Under Patronym 
Argiiello Cardenal, Jose 
Argiiello Cardenal, Silvio 
Argiiello Robelo, Dora Maria 
Argiiello Sacasa, Fanor 
Argiiello Sacasa, Fernando 
Argiiello Sacasa, Fernando 
y Cia. Ltda. 
Argiiello Sacasa, Frederico 
Argiiello Telleria (Ana, 
Teresita, Claudia) 
Argiiello Telleria y Cia. Ltda. 
Argiiello, Maria Mercedes 
Lanzas de 
Argiiello, Carlota Mantica de 
Argiiello, Maria del Rosario de 
Argiiello, Fresta Telleria de 
Argiiello Gurdian y Cia. 
Algodonera del Pacifico 
Algodonera Nicaragiiense Argiiello 
Lacayo y Cia. Ltda. 
ARGUELLQ 
Mz. H A D  Listed Under Patronvm Mz. 
Total Holdings 11,160 
Agricola San Augustin Argiiello 600 
y Cia. Ltda. 
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